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Comparative Analysis of Syria’s 2025 Interim Constitution and the 2012 Constitution

This analysis examines the key differences between Syria’s 2012 Constitution under Bashar al-Assad and the 2025 Interim Constitution signed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The focus is on governance structures, human rights, the role of religion, judicial independence, inclusivity, transitional provisions, and international reactions.

1. Political System and Governance Structure

2012 Syrian Constitution

The 2012 Syrian Constitution established a unitary presidential republic, centralizing significant power in the presidency. The president held substantial authority over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, with limited checks on power. The president had the authority to dissolve the People's Assembly, appoint ministers, and issue decrees. The judiciary was nominally independent; however, the president headed the Supreme Judicial Council, effectively consolidating control over the judiciary. (GlobaLex, Syrians for Truth and Justice)

2025 Interim Constitution

The 2025 Interim Constitution introduces a transitional governance framework, retaining substantial executive powers for the president. Notably, the president appoints all judges to the Supreme Constitutional Court, consolidating control over the judiciary.

A new legislative body, the People's Assembly, is established. One-third of its members are directly appointed by the president, and the remaining members are selected by a committee appointed by the president. The People's Assembly holds legislative authority, including proposing and approving laws, amending or repealing previous laws, ratifying international treaties, and approving the state’s general budget. (ConstitutionNet)

Analysis

Both constitutions centralize power in the presidency. The 2025 Interim Constitution introduces a new legislative body, albeit with limited independence, and retains significant presidential control over the judiciary. The establishment of the People's Assembly in the 2025 Interim Constitution may be seen as a step toward inclusivity, but the president's control over its composition raises concerns about genuine democratic representation.

The continued centralization of power in the presidency under the 2025 Interim Constitution suggests a potential continuation of authoritarian governance, despite the introduction of new institutional structures. The lack of independent checks on executive power may undermine efforts toward democratic reforms and accountability. (Human Rights Watch)

2. Human Rights and Civil Liberties

2012 Syrian Constitution

The 2012 Syrian Constitution nominally guaranteed freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion. Article 3 stated that the state "respects all religions" and ensures the freedom to perform all rituals "provided that this does not disturb public order." However, in practice, these rights were heavily restricted. The government maintained strict control over media outlets, and dissent was often met with repression. Journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens who criticized the regime faced censorship, detention, torture, and even death in custody. All media outlets were required to obtain permission from the Interior Ministry to operate, and private media in government-controlled areas were generally owned by individuals associated with the regime. (ConstitutionNet, Freedom House)

2025 Interim Constitution

The 2025 Interim Constitution introduces provisions that claim to protect religious freedoms. Article 3 asserts that "freedom of belief is protected," and the state "respects all divine religions and guarantees the freedom to perform all their rituals, provided that this does not disturb public order." Additionally, the constitution establishes a Transitional Justice Commission tasked with adopting measures to address past abuses and promote justice and truth. (ConstitutionNet, Amnesty International)

However, the constitution also designates Islamic jurisprudence as the "main source" of legislation and requires the president to be Muslim. These provisions have raised concerns among minority groups, including Kurds, Alawites, Christians, and Druze, who fear that the emphasis on Islamic law could marginalize their rights and undermine the secular nature of the state. Protests erupted in various regions, with demonstrators expressing opposition to what they perceived as an authoritarian and sectarian constitution. (Wikipedia)

Analysis

While the 2025 Interim Constitution asserts protections for religious freedoms, its provisions may conflict with these rights by establishing Islamic law as a primary source of legislation and imposing religious criteria for the presidency. This duality could undermine the constitutional guarantees of freedom of belief and equality before the law. The emphasis on Islamic jurisprudence may lead to the prioritization of religious norms over universal human rights standards, potentially marginalizing non-Muslim communities and individuals who do not adhere to Islamic beliefs. Furthermore, the requirement for the president to be Muslim could exclude qualified individuals from minority religious backgrounds from holding the highest office, contradicting principles of equal citizenship and non-discrimination.

The lack of clear mechanisms for the protection of civil liberties and the concentration of power in the presidency raise concerns about the potential for authoritarian governance. Without independent oversight and accountability, there is a risk that the constitutional provisions may be undermined in practice, as has occurred under previous regimes. The international community, including organizations like Human Rights Watch, has expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the interim constitution in safeguarding human rights and promoting genuine democratic reforms.

In conclusion, while the 2025 Interim Constitution includes provisions that appear to protect human rights and civil liberties, its implementation and the broader political context suggest that these protections may be insufficient to ensure genuine respect for individual freedoms and minority rights. The constitution's emphasis on Islamic law and the centralization of executive power may pose challenges to the realization of a pluralistic and inclusive society.

3. Role of Religion in the State

2012 Syrian Constitution

The 2012 Syrian Constitution maintained a balance between secularism and Islamic influence in governance. While the constitution explicitly defined the state as "secular" in principle, Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia) was recognized as a primary source of legislation. Article 3 of the 2012 Constitution established Islam as the state religion, stating that the state "respects all religions" while acknowledging Islam as the "principal" source of legislation. However, it did not declare Islamic law as the sole source of legislation, allowing for a broader legal framework. (constituteproject.org)

Despite this secular framework, in practice, the Syrian government favored Sunni Islam, which forms the majority religious group in the country. The Assad regime, which is Alawite (a branch of Shia Islam), relied heavily on Sunni-majority institutions and Sunni religious leaders to maintain a degree of legitimacy among the population, although it faced criticism for perceived sectarianism. The state-sponsored religious institutions, such as the Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments), were predominantly focused on Sunni Islamic practices. Furthermore, under the 2012 constitution, the protection of minority religions such as Christianity, Druze, and others was constitutionally guaranteed, but in practice, these minorities were often sidelined, with significant power remaining in the hands of the Alawite-led government. (freedomhouse.org)

2025 Interim Constitution

The 2025 Interim Constitution, by contrast, formalizes the role of Islam in governance in a much more explicit manner. Article 3 of the new constitution not only asserts that "freedom of belief is protected," but it also establishes Islamic jurisprudence as the "main source" of legislation. This provision strongly shifts the balance toward Islamic law and creates an environment where Islamic principles could potentially overrule secular legislation. The president is also required to be Muslim, which could exclude any non-Muslim citizen from holding the highest office in the country. This shift has led to concerns about the further marginalization of religious minorities, such as Christians, Druze, and Alawites, who are not Muslims. (constitutionnet.org) (persecution.org)

Furthermore, the 2025 Constitution claims to protect "all divine religions" but places Islam at the center of governance, which could have implications for the legal status of non-Islamic religious practices. This juxtaposition between the claim of religious pluralism and the designation of Islam as the "main source" of legislation creates a tension. Critics argue that while the constitution may be presented as a gesture toward religious freedom, it may effectively undermine the secular framework and potentially lead to religious-based discrimination in public life, including in legal, political, and cultural spheres. (persecution.org)

Analysis

The 2025 Interim Constitution makes a more explicit commitment to Islam's centrality in governance compared to the 2012 Constitution. While the 2012 Constitution acknowledged Islam as a major source of law, it allowed for a broader legal framework and maintained a nominally secular identity, at least in theory. By contrast, the 2025 Interim Constitution places Islamic jurisprudence front and center, making it the "main source" of all legislation, which could have significant consequences for the legal treatment of religious minorities, as well as the overall secular nature of the state. This provision strengthens the role of Islamic law in the judicial system and opens the door for Sharia principles to influence policies related to social issues such as family law, inheritance, and women's rights. In practice, this could marginalize non-Muslim communities who may be subject to laws that are not aligned with their religious beliefs and practices.

The requirement that the president be Muslim also introduces a significant limitation on political participation. This provision could perpetuate sectarianism, further entrenching the Sunni Muslim-dominated political establishment and marginalizing religious minorities, particularly the Alawites, Christians, and other non-Muslim groups. This may also limit political stability in the long term, especially given Syria's complex demographic landscape, where minorities represent a significant portion of the population.

While the 2025 constitution includes provisions for "all divine religions" to be respected, the prioritization of Islamic jurisprudence may effectively overshadow the protection of religious minorities. In practice, the constitutional claim of protecting religious freedom may be at odds with the principle of secularism, as Islamic law could take precedence over constitutional guarantees of religious equality. This dynamic could lead to legal discrimination against non-Muslim groups, undermining the pluralistic society that was initially envisioned under the 2012 constitution.

International Reactions

The international community, particularly human rights organizations, has expressed concerns about the 2025 Interim Constitution's potential impact on religious freedom. Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have raised alarms over the centrality of Islamic law, fearing that it could lead to increased persecution of religious minorities in Syria. (hrw.org) Moreover, such provisions may complicate Syria's relations with Western nations and international organizations that prioritize secular governance and human rights. The imposition of Islamic law may also strain Syria's already fragile relations with minority and non-Muslim populations within the country and may limit the prospects for national reconciliation. (persecution.org)

In conclusion, the 2025 Interim Constitution formalizes Islam's role in governance much more explicitly than the 2012 Constitution, which leaves open the possibility for a more pluralistic legal framework. While it offers protection for religious freedoms, the constitutional provisions in the 2025 text could challenge the legal status of religious minorities and the principle of secularism in Syria. This shift towards a more Islamic governance framework could have wide-reaching implications for Syria's political, legal, and social structure, potentially deepening sectarian divisions and marginalizing minority communities.

4. Judicial Independence and Rule of Law

2012 Syrian Constitution

Under the 2012 Syrian Constitution, the judiciary was formally defined as independent, in line with many modern constitutions. However, in practice, the judiciary was heavily influenced by the executive branch, and this nominal independence was not meaningfully upheld. The president had considerable control over the judicial system, with the authority to appoint judges to key positions, including the judiciary's highest body, the Supreme Judicial Council.

The 2012 constitution did attempt to ensure a balance by establishing a constitutional court, which was intended to oversee the constitutionality of laws. However, the members of the Supreme Constitutional Court were appointed by the president, undermining its independence. The lack of external oversight bodies or independent institutions to challenge the government's actions made the judiciary vulnerable to political pressure. For example, many judges were either aligned with the ruling regime or were subject to dismissal or retaliation for decisions that did not align with the president’s interests. This compromised the rule of law and limited accountability for government actions. (constituteproject.org)

Additionally, the Assad regime maintained a highly centralized power structure, where decisions on matters of law, including court rulings, were often made by the executive, further diluting the judiciary's independence. The practice of appointing political loyalists to key judicial posts further reinforced the regime’s control over the legal system. For instance, the judiciary’s handling of high-profile political dissidents and opposition figures often revealed the lack of impartiality, with courts regularly serving as tools for political repression. This dynamic was a key factor in the deterioration of Syria’s legal system, especially in the years leading up to the civil war.

2025 Interim Constitution

In contrast, the 2025 Interim Constitution establishes a more explicit claim to judicial independence. The preamble and several provisions in the constitution assert the principle of judicial independence, positioning the judiciary as an essential pillar for protecting the rights and freedoms of Syrian citizens. However, this constitutional claim to independence is significantly undermined by provisions that allow the president to maintain significant control over the judiciary. Specifically, the president retains the exclusive right to appoint judges to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which is a critical institution tasked with upholding constitutional rights and ensuring the legality of government actions. This appointment power raises concerns about the judiciary's ability to serve as a genuine check on the executive.

The president's control over the highest judicial body is particularly troubling because the Supreme Constitutional Court plays a vital role in interpreting the constitution and ensuring that laws align with constitutional principles. The appointment of judges by the president could result in a court that is biased or aligned with the political agenda of the ruling regime. This process undermines the core function of the judiciary, which should act as an impartial arbiter between the state and its citizens. Although the 2025 constitution offers a framework for judicial independence, the president's appointment power diminishes its practical effect. (Rojava Information Center)

Furthermore, the 2025 Interim Constitution provides no independent oversight mechanisms to hold the judiciary accountable, which continues the practice established under the 2012 constitution. While the 2025 document mentions the need for judicial reforms to safeguard independence, it lacks specific mechanisms or institutions designed to ensure impartiality, such as an independent commission for judicial appointments or a transparent process for handling complaints of judicial misconduct. Without such mechanisms, judicial independence remains at the discretion of the executive.

Analysis

Both the 2012 and 2025 constitutions claim to uphold judicial independence, but in practice, both fail to implement sufficient safeguards against executive overreach. The president's power to appoint judges, particularly to the Supreme Constitutional Court, remains a critical issue in both documents. While the 2012 constitution allows for presidential control over judicial appointments, the 2025 constitution formalizes this practice, establishing a system in which the judiciary is more directly influenced by the executive. This lack of separation between the executive and the judiciary is a significant barrier to establishing a robust rule of law in Syria.

In both cases, the absence of meaningful checks on the president's power to influence the judiciary means that the courts are unlikely to act as an effective counterbalance to the executive. This weakens the overall system of checks and balances, diminishing accountability and fostering an environment where government actions can go unchallenged. In the context of Syria’s post-conflict transition, where rebuilding trust in institutions is crucial, the lack of judicial independence under both constitutions could impede efforts at reconciliation and justice.

Moreover, the lack of institutional reforms or independent bodies to oversee judicial appointments means that political loyalty remains a central factor in the selection of judges. This may further entrench a culture of political control over the judiciary, diminishing the public’s confidence in the legal system and the state's commitment to justice and fairness. Such a system also contributes to the politicization of judicial decisions, particularly in cases involving political dissidents, opposition figures, or human rights defenders.

While the 2025 Interim Constitution emphasizes the importance of judicial independence, its provisions fail to address the underlying issue of executive control over the judiciary. For Syria to transition toward a more democratic and stable political order, it will be essential to introduce reforms that not only protect judicial independence in principle but also establish institutional mechanisms to safeguard this independence in practice. This includes transparent appointment processes, the creation of independent oversight bodies, and mechanisms to ensure that judges can operate free from political interference.

International Perspectives

International actors, including human rights organizations and international legal experts, have consistently criticized Syria’s judiciary for its lack of independence. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have both highlighted the judiciary’s role in enabling political repression, particularly during the Syrian civil war. These organizations have called for significant judicial reforms to ensure that the judiciary is independent and capable of protecting citizens' rights and freedoms. The international community’s assessment of the 2025 Interim Constitution will likely hinge on whether Syria introduces meaningful reforms to address these concerns. (Amnesty International) (Human Rights Watch)

While both the 2012 and 2025 constitutions assert the principle of judicial independence, the reality remains that presidential control over judicial appointments continues to undermine this independence. The 2025 Interim Constitution, despite its nominal commitment to judicial autonomy, perpetuates the executive’s control over the judiciary by granting the president the authority to appoint judges to the Supreme Constitutional Court. Without institutional safeguards or independent oversight, the judiciary’s role as a check on executive power is severely limited, further entrenching the lack of accountability in Syria’s political system. For Syria’s future to be based on genuine rule of law, judicial reforms that ensure the separation of powers, transparency, and independence are necessary.

Inclusivity and Representation

2012 Syrian Constitution

The 2012 Syrian Constitution was presented as a reformist response to the rising demands for political change during the Arab Spring. It promised political pluralism and democratic reforms, but in practice, the constitution failed to deliver on these promises. A key criticism of the 2012 document is that it was drafted without broad political consultation or the involvement of opposition groups, civil society, or marginalized communities. The constitution was largely shaped by the ruling party, the Ba'ath Party, which consolidated power in the hands of President Bashar al-Assad and his allies.

The constitution’s provisions for political parties were nominal, as it explicitly recognized political pluralism but imposed restrictive limitations that made it difficult for opposition parties to thrive. Article 8, which once enshrined the dominance of the Ba'ath Party as the "leading party" in the state, was removed in the 2012 version, yet the political space remained tightly controlled by the regime. Despite the de jure allowance for multiple political parties, in practice, the state maintained significant control over the formation and operation of opposition groups. Political parties had to conform to certain limits, including being barred from advocating for a change in the political system or challenging the regime’s fundamental ideology. As a result, the 2012 constitution failed to create a truly pluralistic political environment, and the political opposition remained fragmented, suppressed, or exiled.

Moreover, the 2012 constitution did not provide mechanisms for genuine political participation by the Syrian people. Elections were highly controlled, and opposition figures were often excluded or subjected to state repression, either through imprisonment or coercion. As the civil war escalated, the government's tight control over the political system exacerbated the country's internal divisions, leading to further disillusionment with the political process.

2025 Interim Constitution

The 2025 Interim Constitution introduces some reforms aimed at fostering political pluralism and inclusivity. It explicitly acknowledges the importance of political parties and civil society organizations, providing a legal framework for their establishment and operation. This change represents a shift from the heavily centralized system of the 2012 constitution, where the ruling party and president exercised near-total control over the political sphere.

One of the key features of the 2025 Interim Constitution is the establishment of a Transitional Justice Commission (TJC). This commission is intended to address past human rights violations and promote national reconciliation in the aftermath of the civil war. The TJC aims to investigate abuses committed by all sides during the conflict, which could play a pivotal role in creating an environment conducive to inclusive peace-building. This provision is an attempt to redress the human rights violations that occurred during the regime's crackdown on opposition movements and the subsequent years of conflict. Such a body has the potential to offer mechanisms for justice, truth-telling, and accountability, all crucial for achieving long-term peace and healing in a post-conflict society (Voice of America).

The constitution also introduces provisions for the formation of political parties and associations, signaling a potential move toward a more open political system. This is an important step towards increasing political participation and encouraging diverse political views. However, this move remains constrained by the reality that the president continues to hold considerable control over political institutions. The president’s extensive powers, including appointing members of key political bodies, may undermine the independence and effectiveness of these institutions. Despite the explicit recognition of political parties and civil society, their true influence and ability to operate freely will likely be limited by the regime's grip on power. Critics argue that the system might still be heavily tilted in favor of the ruling party and its allies, which could hinder the development of a genuinely inclusive political system.

Furthermore, while the 2025 constitution promotes greater political participation, it still does not address the fundamental issue of the absence of free and fair elections. The lack of independent electoral oversight, coupled with the president's control over political appointments, means that elections under this framework may remain a tool for the regime to maintain its power, rather than a genuine mechanism for political change and pluralism.

Analysis

The 2025 Interim Constitution introduces mechanisms aimed at fostering political participation and inclusivity, such as the establishment of political parties and civil society organizations and the creation of a Transitional Justice Commission. These provisions signal a potential shift toward a more open and pluralistic political system. However, the constitution is still heavily shaped by the centralized power of the president, which undermines the possibility of a genuinely inclusive and representative political environment.

One of the most significant challenges to inclusivity is the president’s extensive powers. Despite the promise of a more inclusive system, the president retains substantial authority over key political institutions, including the ability to appoint members of the legislature and judicial bodies. This concentration of power means that the president has the capacity to shape the political landscape in a way that could limit the effectiveness of political parties, civil society groups, and other institutions that are intended to promote inclusivity. Political pluralism may remain a superficial concession rather than a reality if the executive branch maintains control over these new institutions.

In addition, while the Transitional Justice Commission represents an important attempt to address past human rights violations, it is unclear how effectively it will operate under a political system where the president and the ruling elite hold significant power. There are concerns that the commission could be politicized and used as a tool for consolidating the regime's legitimacy rather than genuinely fostering reconciliation. The success of the TJC will largely depend on the independence of its members and its ability to operate free from political interference.

Another potential issue lies in the electoral system. While the 2025 constitution allows for political parties, the effectiveness of these parties will be contingent on whether the political environment allows for true competition. If the electoral system continues to be manipulated by the president and his allies, political participation will remain a hollow promise. Moreover, the role of opposition parties in the formation of the new government is still highly uncertain. Given the complex political realities in Syria, it remains to be seen how effective the 2025 constitution will be in creating a truly inclusive political system, especially given the existing political and security dynamics.

The 2025 Interim Constitution makes notable strides in recognizing the importance of political participation and inclusivity. It opens the door to political pluralism, civil society participation, and the establishment of a Transitional Justice Commission, all of which are essential for Syria’s post-conflict recovery. However, the president's continued dominance over political institutions, combined with the lack of independent oversight in elections, could limit the potential for these reforms to bring about genuine inclusivity and representation. As such, while the 2025 constitution presents an opportunity for a more inclusive political framework, its practical impact will depend on how it is implemented and whether it can overcome the entrenched power structures that have long defined Syria's political system.

6. Transitional Provisions and Stability

2012 Syrian Constitution

The 2012 Syrian Constitution, adopted in the midst of growing protests and the early stages of the civil war, lacked substantial provisions for addressing national reconciliation or post-conflict rebuilding. While the document was framed as a response to the demands for reform, it failed to meaningfully address the deep political and social divisions that had sparked the uprising. The 2012 constitution maintained a highly centralized political structure under the authority of the executive branch, particularly the presidency. This centralization, coupled with the continued dominance of the ruling party (the Ba'ath Party), limited the potential for meaningful political reforms, especially ones aimed at reconciling the different factions and groups involved in the conflict.

One of the critical shortcomings of the 2012 constitution was its failure to establish any effective framework for national reconciliation. The political system remained heavily focused on preserving the status quo and protecting the regime’s control over the state apparatus. There was no mechanism to address the grievances of the opposition, civil society, or marginalized groups, which only deepened the societal fractures. This lack of attention to the need for dialogue and reconciliation, coupled with the regime’s repressive tactics, contributed directly to the escalation of the civil war. The ongoing violence and the deepening polarization of Syrian society were compounded by the absence of any serious constitutional provisions for post-conflict reconstruction or transitional justice.

The absence of a robust, inclusive process for reconciliation left Syria with few avenues for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, exacerbating the suffering of civilians and undermining the prospects for long-term stability. The 2012 constitution’s focus on reinforcing the regime’s control, rather than on addressing the underlying causes of unrest or providing for a just and equitable recovery, created an environment where peace seemed increasingly out of reach.

2025 Interim Constitution

In contrast, the 2025 Interim Constitution introduces provisions aimed at addressing the post-conflict challenges of Syria. One of the most notable provisions is the establishment of a Transitional Justice Commission (TJC), which is explicitly tasked with addressing past human rights abuses, promoting national reconciliation, and facilitating the rebuilding of Syrian society. The TJC is intended to investigate crimes committed by all parties to the conflict, including the government, opposition groups, and external actors, and provide a framework for justice and accountability. This represents a significant shift from the 2012 constitution, which failed to consider such mechanisms for reconciliation and post-conflict healing.

The Transitional Justice Commission outlined in the 2025 constitution has several key objectives:

  • Investigating Past Abuses: The TJC will examine atrocities committed during the civil war, which include war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of human rights.
  • Providing Redress: The commission will aim to offer redress to victims through legal mechanisms, including reparations, apologies, and recognition of the suffering endured by affected individuals and communities.
  • Fostering Dialogue: The commission seeks to foster dialogue between conflicting parties and facilitate an inclusive process of rebuilding trust, which is crucial for creating a sustainable peace.
  • Preventing Impunity: By holding perpetrators accountable, the TJC aims to prevent future abuses and set a precedent for the rule of law in post-conflict Syria. This process could help mitigate the risks of further violence by ensuring that those responsible for human rights violations face legal consequences.

However, the effectiveness of the TJC will depend on several critical factors. First, the political will of the regime and other influential actors to support the commission’s work is essential. The president and key political elites will need to allow the commission to operate independently, without interference from those who may be implicated in human rights abuses. This raises the issue of whether the commission will be able to act impartially or whether it will be co-opted for political purposes.

Second, the implementation of the TJC's findings could be hampered by ongoing political and security instability. The Syrian state’s capacity to rebuild and rehabilitate its institutions is limited, especially in areas that have been severely impacted by the conflict. A lack of funding, expertise, and infrastructure could undermine the effectiveness of the TJC and its ability to deliver justice and reconciliation.

Another key consideration is the inclusivity of the process. While the TJC aims to investigate abuses committed by all parties, there is a risk that the process could be selectively applied. If the commission is perceived as biased or as targeting only certain groups while absolving others, it could fuel further resentment and division, rather than healing the wounds of the conflict. It is also important that the process of national reconciliation involves all sectors of Syrian society, including ethnic and religious minorities, opposition groups, and civil society, ensuring that the process is not monopolized by the regime or any particular faction.

Furthermore, the relationship with international actors will play a role in the success of transitional justice efforts. International organizations, such as the United Nations and human rights groups, have advocated for accountability in Syria and could provide support for the TJC’s work. However, this could also be complicated by geopolitical dynamics, particularly the role of foreign powers like Russia and Iran, which have supported the Assad regime. The international community’s willingness to provide financial support and technical expertise could be vital, but it may be influenced by political considerations and the desire to avoid confrontation with the Syrian government.

Analysis

The 2025 Interim Constitution introduces important mechanisms for post-conflict stability, including the establishment of the Transitional Justice Commission. This marks a significant departure from the 2012 constitution, which failed to address the root causes of the conflict and left no clear mechanisms for national reconciliation or justice. By providing a framework for investigating human rights abuses, offering redress to victims, and promoting national dialogue, the 2025 constitution holds promise for building a more inclusive and stable Syria.

However, the success of these transitional provisions is far from guaranteed. The commission’s ability to function independently and impartially will depend on the political climate and the willingness of the regime and other factions to engage in genuine reconciliation. Given the concentration of power in the hands of the president and the security apparatus, the regime’s support for the commission could be lukewarm at best, especially if prominent figures within the government are implicated in the abuses. Furthermore, the long-term stability of Syria will also depend on the government’s ability to implement the commission’s findings and ensure that they result in meaningful changes on the ground, including reparations for victims, reform of state institutions, and the rebuilding of war-torn areas.

Moreover, external support will be essential for the success of the transitional justice process. Without the involvement of international actors—whether through diplomatic pressure, financial support, or technical assistance—the commission may struggle to make a meaningful impact. However, international engagement also comes with risks, including potential interference in Syria’s internal political dynamics or the politicization of the process.

In conclusion, while the 2025 Interim Constitution introduces important measures for post-conflict reconciliation, the actual impact of these provisions will depend on the regime’s political will, the inclusivity of the process, the capacity for implementation, and the involvement of international actors. The true test of the constitution’s effectiveness will be whether it can transition from a theoretical framework to practical action that leads to a just and stable Syria.

Conclusion

While both constitutions centralize power in the presidency, the 2025 Interim Constitution introduces new governance structures and provisions for political participation and transitional justice. However, concerns remain regarding the concentration of executive authority and the potential implications for human rights and judicial independence. The effectiveness of the 2025 Interim Constitution in fostering a democratic and inclusive Syria will depend on the commitment to implement its provisions and address the challenges of the transitional period.

References

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